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I. INTRODUCTION
“Without some relief from the proposed [medical loss ratio] requirements . . . we fear there will ultimately be little room for meaningful competition in all the states . . . .”1
- Kevin S. Wrege, Regional Director of State Affairs for the Council
for Affordable Health Insurance (CAHI), writing on behalf of CAHI
In the face of a downturned economy and rising costs of health care,
the United States is in dire need of some sort of solution.2 Although comprehensive health care reform seems to be a viable solution to the health
care problems every American faces, the Obama Administration’s Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is only damaging an already
broken system.3 Despite strong opposition, PPACA was rapidly pushed
through Congress by marginal votes and ultimately became law on March
23, 2010.4 PPACA is designed to reform the health insurance industry and
largely ignores health care providers.5 While the enactment of PPACA was
viewed as a triumph for the Obama Administration, it casts a much darker
shadow on the future of the health insurance industry that it regulates.
Through provisions requiring minimum covered benefits, rate justifications,
limits on selecting eligible enrollees, and most notably, an excessively high
minimum medical loss ratio, this law involves substantial regulation of the
health insurance industry that rises to the level of systematic coercion. The
control that the United States Legislature exerts over the insurance industry
through PPACA is tantamount to that of a public utility. As such, in creating this law, ratemaking was wrongly implemented and unconstitutionally
applied in a manner that strips the health insurance industry of its Fifth
Amendment right to receive a reasonable rate of return on its investments.
Although the purported goals of health care reform, such as lowering health
care costs, increasing health care quality, and simplifying health care trans1.
Letter from Kevin S. Wrege, Regional Director of State Affairs for the Council
for Affordable Health Insurance (“CAHI”), writing on behalf of CAHI, to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) (May 7, 2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_hrsi_comments_CAHI_5-7.pdf.
2.
In 2008, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that 15.4% of U.S. residents were
uninsured. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE
UNITED
STATES:
2008,
21
(Sept.
2009),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf.
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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actions, are undoubtedly noble, the resulting legislation overreaches constitutional legislative power and will ultimately prove to be a death knell for
the health insurance industry.
While states have standing and are challenging the constitutionality of
PPACA under the Commerce Clause and General Welfare Clause of Article
I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution,6 the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment7 affords insurance companies standing to seek relief because of the mandated medical loss ratio (MLR) provision in section 2718
of PPACA.8 This Comment argues that the ratemaking portion of PPACA
deprives insurance companies of their property without just compensation,
in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Part II discusses the newly enacted health care reform law, PPACA, including a brief
history and major provisions affecting the health insurance industry. Part
III explores the various constitutional challenges that have already been
brought against the federal government questioning the validity of PPACA.
It outlines various constitutional provisions that the enactment of PPACA
allegedly violates, as well as both judicial and legislative efforts to repeal
the law. Part IV explains the constitutional analysis used by the Supreme
Court in deciding ratemaking cases under the Fifth Amendment. It outlines
the contexts in which ratemaking usually occurs, as well as describes several tests historically used by the Supreme Court to determine whether a
mandated rate of return is confiscatory, including those in Smyth v. Ames,9
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,10 and Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch.11 Part
V analyzes the ratemaking portion of PPACA in a constitutional context
using ratemaking case law. It analogizes the aggregate effect of provisions
in PPACA to the facts and circumstances of ratemaking case law, details
why legislative ratemaking was wrongly applied in drafting PPACA, and
argues that PPACA violates health insurance companies’ Fifth Amendment
rights.12 Part VI concludes that the mandated minimum MLR in PPACA
deprives health insurance companies of a reasonable rate of return, thus
failing any Fifth Amendment Takings Clause analysis, and should be struck
down as an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation.
6.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also Health Law Resources - PPACA, AM. HEALTH
LAWYERS
ASS’N,
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Resources/Health%20Law%20Wiki/PPACA.aspx (last updated Aug. 6, 2010).
7.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124
Stat. 119, at 136-137 (2010).
9.
169 U.S. 466 (1898).
10.
315 U.S. 575 (1942).
11.
488 U.S. 299 (1989).
12. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308; Smyth, 169 U.S. at 466; Hope Natural Gas, 315
U.S. at 575.
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THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, enacted on March 23,
2010,13 along with the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act,
enacted on March 30, 2010,14 are the results of the health care reform efforts of the Obama administration.15 In light of the particularly high cost of
health care and health insurance in the United States, the number of Americans who go without health insurance each year16—by choice or by necessity—and the perception of corruption in the industry that has been presented
to the American public, the Obama Administration introduced these health
care reform instruments as a solution to every American’s health care concerns.17 These new federal laws were enacted as an attempt to increase
health care coverage in the United States while minimizing costs and increasing quality.18 In doing so, they provide for extensive federal regulation
of the health insurance industry of a kind never before imposed on any industry by the federal government.19
A.

HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE REFORM

The discussion surrounding these health care reform efforts began preceding the 2008 Democratic presidential primary election, when thenSenator Barack Obama laid out the foundations for his comprehensive
reform plans.20 After assuming the presidency, President Obama formally
began the health care reform process by holding a White House forum with
congressional and industry leaders and pushing for enactment before the
congressional summer recess in 2009.21 However, in large part due to
13.
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
14.
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
15. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010).
16.
The U.S. Census Bureau reported that 15.4% of U.S. residents were uninsured
in 2008. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2.
17. See Remarks of President Barack Obama - Address to Joint Session of Congress, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-barack-obama-address-joint-session-congress.
18. See id.
19.
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010). See also Richard A. Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance
Reform: Why the Reid Bill is Unconstitutional 1-25 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 506; Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 288, Dec. 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527128.
20. The First Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008,
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/debates/transcripts/first-presidentialdebate.html.
21. Timeline: Milestones in Obama’s Quest for Health Care Reform, REUTERS,
(March 22, 2010) http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62L0JA20100322.
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strong Republican opposition, and despite urges from the Obama Administration for quick action, this deadline passed without enactment of any
health care reform legislation.22 Even with this setback, health care reform
efforts continued in Congress, and on November 7, 2009, the House of
Representatives passed its version of the health care reform bill, titled the
Affordable Health Care for America Act, by a narrow vote of 220-215.23
The bill then proceeded to the Senate for review.24 While in the Senate, the House bill was discarded, and instead, the Senate completely incorporated its health care reform agenda into a separate House bill regarding housing taxes, effectively transforming the bill into the earliest version
of PPACA that was ultimately enacted.25 Despite filibuster threats, and after
several amendments to gain further support, the Senate passed this health
care reform bill on December 24, 2009, by a party-line vote of 60-39.26
Following the Senatorial vote, President Obama presented his own
version of health care reform, which was largely similar to the Senate bill
and proposed a consolidation of each of these two bills.27 The consolidated
bill continued to receive stiff opposition, largely from the Republican party,
and as a result, President Obama issued an Executive Order reaffirming the
Hyde Amendment.28 Because of this Order, the bill gained enough support
in the House to pass by a vote of 219-212 on March 21, 2010.29 Almost
immediately following the House vote, legislation was introduced to repeal
the bill.30 Regardless, on March 23, 2010, President Obama signed PPACA
into law.31
B.

THE FINAL VERSION

Contained in the final 2,700-page bill are hundreds of provisions addressing a wide variety of topics in health care that completely restructure
the health care industry.32 In addition, the bill contains over four hundred
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Timeline: Milestones in Obama’s Quest for Health Care Reform, REUTERS,
(March 22, 2010) http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62L0JA20100322.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Timeline: Milestones in Obama’s Quest for Health Care Reform, REUTERS,
(March 22, 2010) http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62L0JA20100322.
32. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1501, 124
Stat. 119, 1029 (2010). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp.
2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010)
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provisions and riders that are completely unrelated to health care.33 All of
these provisions go into effect on differing dates, with most effective dates
spanning a four-year period from the date the bill was signed in 2010 into
the year 2014.34 Some provisions contained in the bill, however, will not go
into effect until the year 2018.35 Although a vast majority of these provisions will have a profound impact on the health insurance industry, there
are several key provisions that will prove to be particularly damaging for
the industry,36 and are worth discussing for the purposes of this Comment.
1.

The Minimum Essential Coverage Provision

The Minimum Essential Coverage Provision, found in section 1501,37
has become, by far, the most widely known, fiercely debated, and extensively litigated provision contained within PPACA.38 As summarized in the
most recent judicial decision involving this provision, Commonwealth ex
rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,39 “[t]he Minimum Essential Coverage Provision
requires that every United States citizen, other than those falling within
specified exceptions, maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage for each month beginning in 2014. Failure to comply will result in a
penalty included with the taxpayer’s annual return.”40
Section 1501 is incorporated into and enforced as a part of the Internal
Revenue Code.41 It details what types and features of health insurance plans
qualify as the “minimum essential coverage” required,42 and it applies to
every U.S. citizen who does not fall within one of the exceptions de33. § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 1029. See also Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 789.
34. § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 1029.
35. Id.
36. See Epstein, supra note 19, at 8.
37. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124
Stat. 119, 242 (2010).
38. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010); Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F.
Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
39. 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
40. Id. at 770.
41. Id.
42. Medicare, Medicade, CHIP, Tricare, veteran and Peace Corp volunteer programs, individual and group (or employer-sponsored) plans, and grandfathered plans (or
health insurance coverage that was effective on March 23, 2010) are all included as “minimum essential coverage.” However, section 2707 lists benefits that must be included in all
individual and small-group plans, called an “essential health benefits package.” See infra
Part II. Certain excepted benefits detailed in section 2791 of the Public Health Service Act
do not qualify as “minimum essential coverage” under section 1501 of PPACA. The Secretary of Health and Human Services is given discretion on determining whether or not a plan
qualifies as “minimum essential coverage,” Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, at
242.
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scribed.43 The dollar amount of the penalty for failure to maintain such coverage phases in over a three-year period: it starts at the greater of $95.00 or
1% of the taxpayer’s income in 2014, rises to $350.00 in 2015, and finally
caps at $750.00 for every subsequent year beginning in 2016.44 This
amount, however, may be adjusted based on the taxpayer’s income.45 The
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is currently being litigated in two
separate cases.46
2.

Provisions Restricting the Underwriting Process

PPACA also places heavy restrictions on the underwriting process in
the health insurance industry.47 Underwriting, in the context of the health
insurance industry, is the process that an insurer uses to assess the financial
risks involved in covering any given applicant, based on a number of factors. Prior to the passage of PPACA, insurers assessed various factors including an applicant’s age, gender, and medical history, among other
things, to determine the applicant’s eligibility for coverage and to set rates
for the coverage that they provided. Under PPACA, however, insurers may
only consider four factors when setting rates:48 the type of plan being offered (family versus individual plan), the geographical region where the
plan is sold,49 the applicant’s age,50 and the applicant’s tobacco use.51 According to section 2705 of PPACA, “health status, medical condition,
claims experience, receipt of health care, medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, disability, or source of injury . . . or any other
43. Members of certain religious groups, organizations, or Indian tribes, incarcerated persons, and persons who cannot afford coverage (as defined within section 1501) are
among those that qualify for exemptions and/or adjustments. Id. at 246-47.
44. Id. at 245.
45. Id. at 246.
46. See infra Part III.A; Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010); Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
47. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2701,
124 Stat. 119, 155 (2010).
48. Id.
49.
Rate variations based on geography are to be established by each state individually, subject to review by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and not by insurers. Id. Premium rates are often sensitive to the areas in which they are being sold, in that a
reasonable rate for residents of a given city, for example, could be extremely expensive for
residents of another. See Epstein, supra note 19.
50. Variation for an applicant’s age is allowed up to a 3-to-1 ratio, meaning the rate
may not vary by more than three times the rate for a non-risk age group. See Epstein, supra
note 36, at 18.
51. Variation for an applicant’s tobacco use is allowed up to a 1.5-to-1 ratio, meaning the rate may not vary by more than one and a half times the rate for non-tobacco users.
See Epstein, supra note 19, at 18.
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health status-related factor determined by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services]” may not be taken into account when evaluating the eligibility or setting premium prices for applicants.52 These requirements are without exception.53
In addition, section 2704 of PPACA prohibits insurers from “impos[ing] any preexisting condition exclusion” to any insurance plan that the
insurer provides.54 In other words, during the period of coverage, insurers
must cover any and all medical conditions an applicant may have under the
terms of the insurance policy, regardless of when the condition developed.55
Similarly, section 2704 also requires that all insurance coverage be “guarantee-issue,” meaning insurers must accept and provide health insurance
coverage for every eligible individual who applies for coverage.56 If an insurer becomes financially unable to provide additional coverage, that insurer may deny an eligible applicant only if they can demonstrate to the applicable state authority their inability to financially underwrite such coverage.57 In addition, the insurer must show that their denial of coverage is not
based upon one of the prohibited factors listed in section 2702 of the Public
Health Service Act, and once the insurer does deny coverage, they must
remain out of that market for 180 days unless the state allows them to reenter.58 Similarly, section 2703 of PPACA prohibits insurers from refusing to
renew or continue coverage for any insured that wishes to renew or continue their coverage.59 Rescission60 of a policy already in force may only occur
in cases where the insured has committed “fraud or ma[de] an intentional
misrepresentation of material fact as prohibited by the terms of the plan.”61

52. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2705, 124
Stat. 119, 156 (2010).
53. See Epstein, supra note 19, at 18.
54. § 2705, 124 Stat. at 154.
55. Id.
56. § 2704, 124 Stat. at 154.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. § 2703, 124 Stat. at 156.
60.
Rescission is the process by which insurers terminate coverage as of the effective date, as if the policy had never existed. Under PPACA, this is the only way an insurer
may discontinue a policy without the consent of the insured, and is limited to cases involving
fraud or intentional misrepresentations of material facts (on an application). Harold Reutter,
BCBS's Website Tracks Health Care Changes, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 22, 2011,
http://www.theindependent.com/articles/2011/01/22/news/local/doc4d3b77ad6b82a9806939
90.txt.
61. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2712 124
Stat. 119, 131 (2010).

2011]

3.

DEAD ON ARRIVAL

585

Essential Benefits Package

In addition to severely limiting insurers’ underwriting ability, PPACA
requires that certain benefits be covered under all individual and smallgroup plans sold.62 These “necessary” benefits, named an “essential health
benefits package,” include coverage for “ambulatory patient services,
emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental
health and substance abuse disorder services, including behavioral health
treatment, prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and
devices, laboratory services, preventive and wellness services and chronic
disease management, [and] pediatric services, including oral and vision
care.”63 This provision impacts the industry two-fold: it means not only that
insurers are required to cover each of these benefits, but also that every
insured must be covered for every one of these services.64
4.

State Exchanges

An integral part of PPACA is the establishment of State Exchanges
within each state.65 Through federal grants given to each state that requests
one, PPACA requires every state to establish governmental agencies or
nonprofit entities called State Exchanges to “facilitate[] the purchase of
qualified health plans.”66 A “qualified health plan” is one that meets the
specific requirements detailed in section 1301 of PPACA, as well as the
additional requirements set by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.67 Qualified health plans must be certified by the Secretary, periodically
recertified as a qualified health plan, and may be decertified for any number
of reasons.68 By way of general tax increases together with new levies on
certain industries, the federal government plans to subsidize the cost of purchasing qualified health plans through these State Exchanges.69
Once a plan is certified as a qualified health plan, it may choose to join
the State Exchanges or not, but will only be allowed to access consumers
that qualify for the federal subsidies by joining.70 Once operating within the
State Exchanges, however, a qualified health plan is subject to extensive
regulation by the state and federal government. Specifically, qualified
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

§ 2707, 124 Stat. at 161.
Id.
Id.
§ 1311, 124 Stat. at 173.
Id.
§ 1301, 124 Stat. at 162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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health plans face disclosures and justifications for rate increases, and state
approvals for such increases.71 In addition, plans operating within State
Exchanges will be rated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for
quality and price, which will be distributed to consumers who are purchasing such plans.72 In essence, plans that submit themselves to State Exchanges have access to consumers who qualify for federal subsidies, but are
subject to extensive regulation. By contrast, plans that operate outside State
Exchanges may not sell plans to consumers who are using federal subsidies,
but at the same time continue to be heavily regulated by the state and federal government.73
5.

The Minimum Medical Loss Ratio

Finally, section 2718 of PPACA mandates a minimum MLR of eighty
percent for small group and individual business and eighty-five percent for
large group business.74 According to the Congressional Budget Office, “[a]
medical loss ratio, or MLR, is the proportion of premium dollars that an
insurer spends on health care; it is commonly calculated as the amount of
claims incurred plus changes in reserves as a fraction of premiums
earned.”75 Under the health care system in place before the passage of
PPACA, the standards for MLRs76 in the individual market ranged from
fifty-five to sixty-five percent, depending on the type of plan.77 The ratemaking portions of PPACA, found in section 2718, require insurance companies to have a minimum MLR of eighty percent for small group and individual business, and eighty-five percent for large group business.78 This
means that for every dollar insurance companies receive in premium payments, they must pay out a minimum of $0.80-$0.85, depending on the type
of business, in claims and other “activities that improve health care quality.”79 In addition, if an insurance company does not maintain such mini71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

§ 1311,124 Stat. 119 .
Id.
Id. See also Epstein, supra note 19.
Id.
Congressional Budget Office, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF PROPOSALS TO
REGULATE MEDICAL LOSS RATIOS, Dec. 14, 2009.
76. Id.
77.
“The NAIC standards for individual market loss ratios vary between 55%-65%,
depending on the type of plan. In fact, most guaranteed renewable plan loss ratios are set by
the states at 60% or less.” Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Letter to the National
Association
of
Insurance
Commissioners,
May
7,
2010,
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_hrsi_comments_CAHI_5-7.pdf.
78.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124
Stat. 119, at 136-137 (2010).
79. Id.
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mum MLR, under section 2718 of PPACA, it must return the difference to
their insurance enrollees in the form of an annual rebate.80
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), along
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, have been charged with
the task of establishing regulations with regard to MLR requirements in
PPACA, including definitions of terms in section 2718 and methods of calculation for MLRs.81 This task bears significant weight due to the notable
ambiguity in much of PPACA absent explanatory regulations such as
these.82 It is important for insurers to have guidelines on which expenses
qualify as claims and other “activities that improve health care quality,” and
which must be included as “non-claims expenses,” in order to accurately
calculate their yearly MLR and operate their businesses accordingly.83
On October 27, 2010, the NAIC publicly presented their fifteen pages
of regulations for MLRs to the Secretary for approval, included with standardized forms for reporting rebate calculations, credibility tables, and
listed expenses that may or may not be calculated in with a company’s loss
ratio.84 For example, “federal taxes and assessments allocated to health insurance coverage reported under Section 2718 of the Public Health Service
Act” are deducted from the premium and therefore calculated in with a
company’s loss ratio, whereas “[f]ederal income taxes on investment income and capital gain” are not.85 It is important to note that all expenses
that do not qualify as claims or other “activities that improve health care,”
(including customer acquisition, agent compensation, claims adjudication,
premium administration, employee costs, all additional administrative expenses required under PPACA such as MLR calculations and rebate administration on a state by state basis, and all other general expenses) may not be
calculated as a part of a company’s loss ratio.86 Therefore, the remaining
twenty percent is not pure profit, because insurance companies must allocate that amount accordingly to cover all of these “non-claims” expenses,
or suffer a loss.87
Section 2718 does allow for some adjustment of the MLR at the discretion of each state and of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.88
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Epstein, supra note 19.
83. Letter from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to Kathleen
Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services (Oct. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_mlr_reg_asadopted.pdf.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 33.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124
Stat. 119, at 136-137 (2010).
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However, states are only afforded the discretion to require a higher MLR
percentage than what is required by PPACA, thereby further restricting
insurance companies.89 The Secretary, on the other hand, may adjust the
MLR to require a lower percentage, but only within the individual market,
and only if it is determined that the rates set out within section 2718 will
“destabilize the existing individual market” in that state.90
The purpose behind this requirement, first and foremost, is to maximize the value for patients’ health care dollars.91 By requiring that a percentage of premiums paid by the insured be used either for claims made by the
insured or for “activities that improve health care quality,”92 PPACA makes
certain that premium dollars are used toward the benefit of each insured.93
Further, such a requirement effectively limits salaries that CEOs and other
executive members of insurance companies may earn, a concern that was
central for some lawmakers to the addition of the ratemaking provision in
PPACA.94 In addition, the ratemaking portion of PPACA is an attempt to
improve patient health care overall by streamlining and simplifying the
process.95 PPACA includes expenses for “activities that improve health care
quality” in determining each insurance company’s MLR96 to incentivize the
use of premium dollars to improve the quality and efficiency of health
care.97

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Letter to the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 1.
92. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124
Stat. 119, at 136-137 (2010).
93. See Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Letter to the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 1.
94. Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia argued that,
For too long, health insurance company CEOs have been
pocketing astronomical salaries all the while denying care and
coming up with foolish reasons to kick people off their insurance policies . . . . If we want to change the culture of health
insurance companies and how they treat individuals and families in need of health care, then we need to change the way
they do business.
Chris Silva, AMA, State Societies Back Plan Limiting Insurers' Administrative Spending,
Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2010/08/30/gvl20830.htm (quoting Sen.
Jay Rockefeller, from an Aug. 16, 2010 statement).
95. See Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Letter to the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 1.
96.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124
Stat. 119, at 136-137 (2010).
97. See Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Letter to the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 1.
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Despite the obvious value of each of these goals to the American public, the ratemaking requirements in PPACA are too severe to achieve any
one of them.98 An eighty to eighty-five percent mandated MLR leaves insurance companies with fifteen to twenty percent, depending on the type of
business, for overhead, agent commission, underwriting expenses, fraud
prevention expenses, employee salaries, etc., and finally, profit.99 Agent
commission alone can amount to up to twenty percent of the first-year premium price,100 leaving insurance companies with a deficit. The effects of
this requirement are already being felt by several many companies across
the nation.101 For example, Maine became the first state to receive a waiver
of the MLR provisions in PPACA due to their inability to meet these requirements.102 This allows insurers in the state of Maine to maintain the
current 65% loss ratio for three years, provided they can show a need for
such waiver.103 As of the publication of this Comment, over 900 waivers
had been granted in total, with many more companies, organizations, and
states applying each day.104
In addition, the Council for Affordable Health Insurance (“CAHI”)
sent a letter to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(“NAIC”),105 explaining the detrimental effects that the MLR would have,
especially on the individual market.106 They also explained how an MLR
set at the rate it currently is under PPACA would work to counteract some
of the policy reasons for implementing such a provision, namely, that
“[e]xcluding many cost containment tools from the consideration of either
98. See id.
99. See Silva, supra note 94.
100. “[Agent] commissions usually range between 4 and 8 percent of the premium,
depending on the state, but sometimes are 20 percent of the premium in the first year of a
policy before dropping to the normal range.” Uwe E. Reinhardt, On Health Care, the Devil’s
in
the
Details,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
3,
2010,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/on-health-care-the-devils-in-the-details/.
101. See Ken Terry, What the NYT Keeps Getting Wrong about McDonald’s and
Healthcare Reform, BNET.COM, Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.bnet.com/blog/healthcarebusiness/what-the-nyt-keeps-getting-wrong-about-mcdonald-8217s-and-healthcarereform/1902.
102. Julian Pecquet, Maine Gets First State Waiver From Healthcare Law Provision,
THE
HILL,
Mar.
8,
2011,
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reformimplementation/148179-maine-gets-reprieve-from-health-reform-insurance-requirement.
103. See id.
104.
Roger Stark, National Health Care Reform: First Year Report Card, KPBJ.COM,
Apr.
4,
2011,
http://kpbj.com/business_weekly/2011-0404/national_health_care_reform_first_year_report_card.
105.
The NAIC has been charged with the task of defining various parts of PPACA,
including what constitutes an expense for “activities that improve health care quality.” See
Pub. L. 111-148; Reinhardt, supra note 100.
106. See Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Letter to the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 1.
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medical claims costs or activities that ‘improve health care quality’ under
the new reform law will only harm patients, while removing an important
incentive for carriers to spend consumer dollars on health claims in a consistently wise and prudent manner.”107 Thus, the minimum MLR provision
will ultimately affect health insurance companies by driving many of them
out of business, effectively disrupting the market, and ultimately eliminating competition.108
III. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PPACA
A.

VIRGINIA V. SEBELIUS AND OTHER ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 CHALLENGES

Currently, twenty-one states109 have filed suit against the federal government in two separate lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of provisions within PPACA, and the number of plaintiffs continues to grow.110
Each of these lawsuits challenge the constitutionality of the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision of PPACA, found in section 1501, under the
Commerce Clause and General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution.111 The substantial number of states that have
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Chris Silva, AMA, State Societies Back Plan Limiting Insurers' Administrative
Spending,
AM.
MED.
NEWS
(Aug.
30,
2010)
http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2010/08/30/gvl20830.htm; Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Letter
to
the
Nat’l
Ass’n
of
Ins.
Comm’rs,
May
7,
2010,
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_hrsi_comments_CAHI_5-7.pdf.
109. See Kevin Sack, Oklahoma: State Will Challenge Health Care Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/us/08brfsSTATEWILLCHA_BRF.html?ref=politics; Health Law Resources – PPACA, AM. HEALTH
LAWYERS
ASS’N,
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Resources/Health%20Law%20Wiki/PPACA.aspx.
110.
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North and South Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington together were the first to file a single lawsuit
against the federal government on March 23, 2010—the day PPACA was signed into law.
Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1127 n.1 (N.D. Fla. 2010).Two private citizens and one private organization are plaintiffs in
this lawsuit as well. Id. at 1127. Kenneth Cuccinelli, II, the Attorney General of Virginia,
filed a separate lawsuit against the federal government on behalf of Virginia. Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
111. See University Advancement Staff, Liberty Counsel Files Health Care Reform
Bill
Lawsuit,
LIBERTY
UNIV.
(Mar.
22,
2010)
http://www.liberty.edu/index.cfm?PID=18495&MID=17033; Thomas More Law Center
Files Court Challenge Moments After Obama Health Care Signed Into Law, THOMAS
MOORE
L.
CTR.
(Mar.
23,
2010)
http://www.thomasmore.org/qry/page.taf?id=18&_function=print&sbtblct_uid1=773&mont
h=03&year=2010; Health Law Resources – PPACA, AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, (Aug 6,
2010) http://www.healthlawyers.org/Resources/Health%20Law%20Wiki/PPACA.aspx.
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challenged PPACA to date has been used by some experts as evidence that
these challenges will eventually succeed.112 However, although each of
these challenges has survived thus far,113 several experts doubt that such
efforts will prove to be successful in ultimately repealing PPACA.114 The
high cost that states face in challenging the law115 coupled with the common law precedent following the New Deal of allowing the federal government significant deference in what it chooses to regulate under the
Commerce Clause leads many experts to believe that the challenges will
fail.116
Two courts—the United States District Court in Pensacola, Florida,117
and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia118—
have been asked to rule on the constitutionality of PPACA in some capacity.119 In Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs,
twenty states together with two private individuals and one private organization brought suit against the federal government, alleging that the passage
of PPACA overreached Congress’s Article I Commerce Clause and General
Welfare Clause powers.120 Specifically, plaintiffs took issue with the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision, the establishment of State Exchanges,
and the provisions expanding the availability of Medicaid, arguing that each
of these provisions “violate the Constitution and state sovereignty by coercing and commandeering the states and depriving them of their ‘historic
flexibility’ to run their state government, healthcare, and Medicaid programs.”121 On January 31, 2011, Justice Roger Vinson ruled on cross motions for summary judgment, holding that the Minimum Essential Coverage
provision was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause

112. See Kevin Arts, Legal Challenges to Health Reform: An Alliance for Health
Reform
Toolkit,
2,
May
18,
2010,
available
at
http://www.allhealth.org/publications/Uninsured/Legal_Challenges_to_New_Health_Refor
m_Law_97.pdfl.
113. See Rosalind S. Helderman, Va. Health-care Suit Can Go Forward, Federal
Judge
Rules,
WASHINGTON
POST,
Aug.
2,
2010
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/virginiapolitics/2010/08/federal_judge.html.
114. See, e.g., Arts, supra note 112.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. See Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (denying the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ motion to dismiss).
118. See Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D.
Va. 2010).
119. See McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1126-28; Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
120. See McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
121. Id. at 1129.
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power, and that this provision was not severable from the rest of PPACA.122
As a result, PPACA as a whole was rendered unconstitutional.123
After surviving a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s claims were narrowed down to two counts.124 Specifically, plaintiffs:
challenge the “individual mandate” set forth in Section
1501 of the Act, which, beginning in 2014 will require that
everyone (with certain limited exceptions) purchase federally-approved health insurance, or pay a monetary penalty.
The individual mandate allegedly violates the Commerce
Clause, which is the provision of the Constitution Congress
relied on in passing it. . . . [T]he state plaintiffs [also] challenge the Act to the extent that it alters and amends the
Medicaid program by expanding that program, inter alia,
to: (i) include individuals under the age of 65 with incomes
up to 133% of the federal poverty level, and (ii) render the
states responsible for the actual provision of health services
thereunder. This expansion of Medicaid allegedly violates
the Spending Clause and principles of federalism protected
under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.125
Although plaintiffs argued that the Medicaid Provisions found in the
Act are so coercive that they have no choice but to participate in the program, Justice Vinson first found that the Medicaid Provisions in the Act did
not exceed Congress’s Spending Clause powers. 126 He reasoned that “state
participation in the Medicaid program under the Act is-as it always has
been-voluntary,” and, while states would lose significant federal funding if
they chose to withdraw from the program, states maintain their ability to
withdraw, even under the new requirements found in PPACA.127 Second,
the court analyzed the Minimum Essential Coverage provision using existing Commerce Clause case law on economic activity.128 Justice Vinson
outlined three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under
the Commerce Clause: channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities
of (or persons or things in) interstate commerce, and activities having substantial relation to interstate commerce.129 In his analysis, he categorized the
122.
Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10M—
cv—91—RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 at *40 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id. at 11-12.
126. See id. at 15.
127. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683 at *4.
128. See generally id.
129. Id. at *18.

2011]

DEAD ON ARRIVAL

593

decision of whether or not to purchase health insurance as “passive inactivity”, stating that
If [Congress] has the power to compel an otherwise passive
individual into a commercial transaction with a third party
merely by asserting-as was done in the Act-that compelling
the actual transaction is itself ‘commercial and economic in
nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce’ . . . it
is not hyperbolizing to suggest that Congress could do almost anything it wanted.130
Citing several cases, the court noted that the Commerce Clause has always
applied to some sort of activity: “[The Supreme Court] has uniformly and
consistently declared that [the Commerce Clause] applies to ‘three broad
categories of activity’”;131 “the third category [of activity which can be regulated has been described as] ‘the power to regulate those activities having
a substantial relation to interstate commerce.’”132 The court held that Congress may not regulate “passive inactivity” such as this, and because the
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision was so integral a part of PPACA
(as the federal government conceded), this invalidated the whole of PPACA
as unconstitutional.133
The Virginia Court was asked to determine specifically whether the
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision, contained in Section 1501 of the
Act, constituted an unconstitutional exercise of power by Congress by way
of a motion for summary judgment.134 In this case, Virginia argued that: (1)
Congress does not possess the power to require individuals to purchase
health insurance under the Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper
Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution;135 (2) the
penalty contained in the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is, in fact,
a penalty and not a tax, and as such does not fall within Congress’ General
Welfare Clause powers;136 and (3) the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision conflicts with the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act,137 and consequently, violates Virginia’s state sovereignty rights under the Tenth
Amendment.138
130. Id. at *21-22 (citing § 1501 of PPACA).
131. Id. at *22 (citing U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995), emphasis in original)
132. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683 at *22 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
133. See generally Bondi, 2011 WL 285683.
134. See Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 770-71
(E.D. Va. 2010).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 771 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2010)).
138. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
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The Secretary of Health and Human Services refuted each of these arguments.139 First, as summarized by Justice Vinson in McCollum,140 the
Secretary argued that Congress acted within its Commerce Clause, or alternatively, Necessary and Proper Clause, powers in enacting PPACA,
through the reasoning that “(1) because the majority of people will at some
point in their lives need and consume healthcare services, and (2) because
some of the people are unwilling or unable to pay for those services, (3)
Congress may regulate everyone and require that everyone have specific,
federally-approved insurance.”141 In addition, the Secretary asserted that the
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision constitutes a tax, and not a penalty,
due to its incorporation into the Internal Revenue Code, assessment on a
taxpayer’s annual tax return, and revenue-raising properties, and as such,
falls within Congress’ power to lay taxes under the General Welfare
Clause.142
On December 13, 2010, J. Hudson found the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision, contained in Section 1501 of PPACA, to be an unconstitutional exercise of power by Congress under both the Commerce Clause and
General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.143 He declined to discuss Virginia’s state supremacy argument, stating that “[t]he Court . . . need not specifically reach this issue.”144 The
court’s holding rested heavily on the determination that the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision regulates neither economic activity nor economic inactivity, both of which have traditionally fallen within Commerce
Clause powers.145 Instead, Congress is trying to regulate an individual’s
decision whether or not to participate in commerce by purchasing insurance.146 In addition, the court noted that extending Commerce Clause powers to a degree such as this opens the doors for the federal government to
have unrestricted power to regulate.147
Turning to the question of the “tax penalty” assessed under the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision, the court cited numerous instances in
which the federal government specifically asserted that it was not a tax.148
In addition, the penalty does not operate like a tax, in that it generates no
139. See id.
140.
Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1162 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
141. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 773 n.2 (citing McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at
1162).
142. Id. at 774.
143. See id. at 788.
144. Id. at 774, n.4.
145. See id. at 772.
146. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
147. Id. at 788.
148. Id. at 786-87.
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revenue if the law is operating as it is meant to (in other words, everyone
purchases insurance, therefore nobody pays the penalty), and its primary
purpose is to regulate, and not to tax.149 For these reasons, the penalty must
be tied to an independent enumerated power within the Constitution in order to be upheld.150 Because of the penalty’s regulatory purpose, the determination that PPACA exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, according to the court, in turn necessitated the determination that Congress
exceeded its General Welfare Clause powers as well.151 In so holding, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of Virginia, and severed the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision from the whole of PPACA.152
Because both courts concluded that Congress has never before extended its Commerce Clause powers to a degree such as that asserted in the
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision,153 these opinions are revolutionary
in the Constitutional Law field, as they outline new and clearer boundaries
to Congress’ power under this Clause.154 Even so, the “atypical and uncharted”155 nature of this case indicates that both cases are sure to be appealed all the way to the United States Supreme Court.156
B.

PRIVATE ORGANIZATION FREEDOM OF RELIGION CLAUSE CHALLENGES

In addition to those Article I, Section 8 claims brought by the states
Liberty University and Thomas More Law Center, two private organizations, challenged PPACA as violating freedom-of-religion rights afforded
by the First Amendment.157 Because certain provisions of PPACA require
participation in nationalized health insurance and provide for abortions,
each of these organizations argues that these provisions violate certain religious beliefs, and therefore infringe on their right to freedom of religion.158
In addition, certain provisions in PPACA provide for exemptions for certain
religious groups, such as the Amish and Old Order Mennonites, but not for
others.159 Although both of these cases were ruled in favor of the federal
149. Id. at 787.
150. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 790.
153. See id. at 788.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 790.
156. “This case, however, turns on atypical and uncharted applications of constitutional law interwoven with subtle political undercurrents . . . . [a]nd the final word will undoubtedly reside with a higher court.” Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
157. See Warren Richey, Healthcare Reform Law Challenged on Religious Grounds,
too, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 26, 2010, available at Westlaw, 2010 WLNR
7558168.
158. See id.
159. See id.
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government, appeals have been filed by both plaintiffs, continuing the discussion of PPACA’s constitutionality under the First Amendment.160
C.

LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS AT REPEALING PPACA

In addition to the lawsuits that have been filed, Virginia, Idaho, Arizona, Georgia, Missouri, and Louisiana have each enacted statutes exempting
their citizens from the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision in
PPACA.161 Arizona and Oklahoma have enacted constitutional amendments
to the same effect. In total, thirty-eight states have filed or pre-filed similar
legislation, the model law of which has become known as the Freedom of
Choice in Health Care Act, and legislators in at least three additional states
have publicly announced intentions to do the same.162 Laws such as these
implicate the Tenth Amendment under the assertion that the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is an unlawful infringement on state sovereignty, and are essentially inviting a lawsuit from the federal government.163
Both Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli164 and Florida ex rel. McCollum165 involve
the Tenth Amendment arguments arising out of laws such as these, but the
courts in each of these cases have yet to address the matter.166
Legislation to repeal PPACA was also introduced almost immediately
following the final House vote, on March 22, 2010.167 Representative Steve
King of Iowa introduced House Bill 4972 on March 25, 2010, which seeks
to repeal PPACA and any laws amending or repealing provisions of
PPACA.168 This bill provides that, “[e]ffective as of the enactment of the
160. Emily Root, More Constitutional Decisions on PPACA, TRIAGE HEALTH LAW
BLOG (Dec. 13, 2010) http://www.triagehealthlawblog.com/ppaca/more-consitutionaldecisions-on-ppaca/.
161. See, e.g., The Virginia Health Care Freedom Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.23430.1:1 (2007 & Supp. 2010); see also ALEC's Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act:
How Your State Can Protect Patients' Rights, AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL,
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=ALEC_s_Freedom_of_Choice_in_Health_
Care_Act1&Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=29&ContentID=135
27 (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
162. See AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, supra note 156.
163. See Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D.
Va. 2010). See also Monica Davey, Health Care Overhaul and Mandatory Coverage Stir
States’ Rights Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A25, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/us/29states.html?_r=1.
164.
728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
165.
Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
166.
The court in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli declined to address the Commonwealth’s Tenth Amendment argument. See generally 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
167. See
H.R.
4972,
111th
(2010),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4972ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr4972ih.pdf.
168. Id.
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, such Act is repealed, and the
provisions of law amended or repealed by such Act are restored or revived
as if such Act had not been enacted.”169 To date, ten bills have been introduced into the House or Senate to repeal, amend, or limit funding for
PPACA.170
IV. RATEMAKING CASE LAW IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Ratemaking, or imposing limitations on the rates companies may
charge for their products or services, is a power that has historically been
afforded to the legislature to implement in situations involving public utilities.171 A public utility is a private company that is providing a public service, and generally has been given a monopoly by the state government.172
Traditionally, two things are required in order for a legislature to have the
power to ratemake.173 First, a monopoly generally must exist, although this
qualification is not universal.174 The ultimate goal of ratemaking is to limit
the returns a company can receive for their services in markets where there
is a lack of competition.175 In other words, by ratemaking, the legislature is
attempting to bring the rates that companies operating within a noncompetitive market charge back to a competitive level.176 Keeping this goal
in mind, it would be illogical and unnecessary for a legislature to ratemake
in an already competitive market.177 Therefore, it flows rationally that a
monopoly must exist for ratemaking to occur.178 Second, when the legislature sets rates, they must allow the regulated company to receive a reasonable rate of return on their investments.179 If rates are too restrictive, the
company will not have the means to serve their customers adequately, if at
all, and will be forced out of business.180 For the same reason, then, it
would never be acceptable for the legislature to set rates so as to bring the
rate of return that a company receives down to zero, because that company

169. Id.
170. See BenefitMall, Legislative Alert: House Actions to Repeal PPACA (2010),
available at https://www.benefitmall.com/portal/EmailArchive/ce1f35ed-06d6-4425-897e994d96867059.pdf.
171. 64 AM. JUR. 2d, Public Utilities § 68 (2001).
172. Id.
173. See Epstein, supra note 19, at 15.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Epstein, supra note 19, at 15-16.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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would then be unable to provide any service.181 Since the ultimate goal is to
limit the company’s rate of return to that it could receive in a competitive
market, a general rule is that a rate set by the legislature may not fall below
the competitive rate, taking into account the level of risk involved in conducting that type of business.182
From a constitutional standpoint, setting and regulating the rates that
these utilities may charge constitutes a governmental regulation of the
property of these companies.183 It is only proper for the judiciary to adjust
the rates set by the legislature when the rates are found to be excessive or
confiscatory.184 An analysis under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment185 follows when there is a question of whether an attempt by the legislature to set rates for a company would be considered excessive or confiscatory.186 The Fifth Amendment affords regulated companies protection
against the taking of private property without just compensation.187 If the
rates are found to be excessive or confiscatory, “the rate regulation would
constitute a taking of the property of the utility” under the Fifth Amendment,188 and as such will be held unconstitutional, and will either be struck
down or adjusted by the judiciary to what would be considered a reasonable
rate.189
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that “private property [may not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”190 This
clause has generally been interpreted as applying to two categories of takings: physical takings and regulatory takings.191 In the case of a physical
taking, the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation when “the government authorizes a physical occupation of [private] property (or actually
takes title) . . . ”192 A regulatory taking, also known as eminent domain,193
on the other hand, does not involve physical possession of private property,
but instead occurs when the government regulates the use of that proper181. See id.
182. See id.
183. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §11.12, at 536537 (7th ed. 2004).
184. Id.
185.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
186.
“The guiding principle has been that the constitution protects utilities from
being limited to a charge for their property serving the public which is so ‘unjust’ as to be
confiscatory.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
188. See NOWAK, supra note 178, at 537.
189. See id.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
191.
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992).
192. Id.
193. See NOWAK, supra note 178, at 538.
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ty.194 To determine whether a regulation constitutes a taking under the Fifth
Amendment, courts consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the
regulation and the affected property, including the purpose of the regulation, and the extent to which the regulation deprives the property owner of
economic use of the property.195 In the ratemaking context, courts examine
“the value of the company and the return upon prudent investments” when
determining whether the rate regulation constitutes a taking.196
While courts have consistently held that rates that are so unreasonable
as to be considered “confiscatory” will be struck down as a taking, they
historically have had much difficulty in settling on what exactly should be
considered in determining whether a rate is “confiscatory.”197 The “value of
a company”198 depends on several factors that may be difficult to quantify,
such as current assets, investments, “good will,” historical financial wellbeing, etc.199 Without first having an accurate determination of the value of
the company, it is extremely difficult to determine whether a rate regulation
substantially deprives a company of economic use of their property.200 As a
result, ratemaking case law has evolved to take several different approaches.201
A.

THE “FAIR VALUE” RULE

Early utility rate regulation case law examined rates as a return on the
“fair value” of the utility, using the “present value of the assets employed
by the utility . . . .”202 In other words, only investments that are currently
used or usable in the business are included in determining the value of the
company.203 In Smyth v. Ames,204 plaintiffs, stockholders of the Union Pacific Railway Company and stockholders of the Chicago & Northwestern
Railroad Company, challenged the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute
which reduced the rates that each of these companies could charge for local
freights.205 The plaintiffs argued that the statute deprived railroad compa194.
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992).
195. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-125
(1978).
196. See NOWAK, supra note 178, at 538.
197. See NOWAK, supra note 178, at 538.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
201. See NOWAK, supra note 178. See also Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898);
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas, Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Missouri ex rel. Sw.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
202. NOWAK, supra note 178, at 537.
203. See Epstein, supra note 36, at 20.
204.
169 U.S. 466 (1898).
205. Id.
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nies of the right to receive a competitive rate of return without just compensation by reducing the rates that each company could charge to an amount
that was unjust.206 The Court found the regulation to be unconstitutional,
stating that “under pretense of regulating fares and freights, the state cannot
require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward
. . . .”207 The Court held that the reasonableness of rates must be determined
by looking at the “fair value of the property being used . . . for the convenience of the public,”208 taking into account all investments currently used by
the company, including,
the original cost of construction, the amount expended in
permanent improvements, the amount and market value of
its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of
the property under particular rates prescribed by statute,
and the sum required to meet operating expenses.209
The Court in Smyth210 adopted this test as an attempt to balance the interests of the public with the constitutional right that each company has to
operate as a business.211 A “company is entitled to ask . . . a fair return upon
the value of that which it employs for the public convenience,” while, on
the other hand, “the public is entitled to demand . . . that no more be exacted from it for the use of [the property] than the services rendered by it
are reasonably worth.”212 By taking into account only investments that are
currently used in the business to calculate the value, companies take the risk
of making investments that will go to waste.213 In return for this risk, however, the “fair value” rule allows for a higher rate of return, or, in other
words, allows companies to charge more for their products and services.214
The court in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Service Commission stated that:
[i]t is impossible to ascertain what will amount to a fair return upon properties devoted to public service, without giving consideration to the cost of labor, supplies, etc., at the
time the investigation is made. An honest and intelligent
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id. at 523 (citing R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307).
Id. at 546.
Id. at 546-47.
169 U.S. 466.
Id. at 547.
Id.
See Epstein, supra note 36, at 20.
Id.
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forecast of probable future values, made upon a view of all
the relevant circumstances, is essential. If the highly important element of present costs is wholly disregarded, such a
forecast becomes impossible. Estimates for to-morrow
cannot ignore prices of to-day.215
However, several problems arise in attempting to apply the “fair value” rule.216 When determining what assets or property items to take into
account in determining the value of the company, items may be inappropriately included or excluded, even though they are or are not used and valuable within the business.217 For example, a court may fail to take into account the value of something like a company’s logo, despite the good will it
may provide for that company. In addition, the value of a thing within the
company and together with other assets could potentially be vastly different
than the value of that same thing outside of the company.218 For example, a
system of codes within a company, such as those used for billing in the
insurance industry, would be extremely valuable for streamlining business,
but that code set outside of the company would be essentially worthless.
Because of the uncertainties and inconsistencies that arise in applying the
“fair value” rule, contemporary courts have attempted to establish alternative means of calculating the “value” of companies in ratemaking cases.219
B.

THE “HISTORICAL COST” OR “PRUDENT INVESTMENT” PRINCIPLE

In his concurring opinion in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, Justice Brandeis held that what is
being appropriated for public use is not the property that the company
owns, but the “capital embarked in the enterprise.”220 As such, Brandeis
stated that the economic value of the property owned by the company is
irrelevant, and the court must instead look at the presumed compensation
that the company would earn under the challenged rate regulation.221 To
determine this, courts must look at the “historical cost,” or the costs at
which the company historically has conducted business.222

215.
262 U.S. 276, 287-88 (1923).
216. See, e.g., Missouri ex. rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S.
276, 290-294 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
217. See id. at 290.
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., id.; see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989);
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas, Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
220. Missouri ex. rel. Sw. Bell, 262 U.S. at 290.
221. Id. at 291.
222. See id.; see also NOWAK, supra note 178, at 537.
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In Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,223 appellee, the
Public Service Commission (PSC), issued an order reducing Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. (Southwestern Bell)’s rates while eliminating certain
fees and charges.224 Southwestern Bell argued that the rates were unjust due
to the fact that their property had increased in value, which, they argue, the
PSC did not properly take into account.225 The Court held that the order
reducing the rates constituted a taking of property without just compensation, and therefore was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.226
Although the Court used the “fair value” rule in determining the reasonableness of the rates that were set, Justice Brandeis laid out the foundations
of what several courts following this opinion adopted in place of the “fair
value” rule, called the “historical cost” or “prudent investment” principle.227
Justice Brandeis stated that prudent investments, at their value at the time
the investments were made, should be considered in determining the value
of Southwestern Bell’s business. He established a four-part test:
the tribunal must determine both what sum would be
earned under it and whether that sum would be a fair return. The decision involves ordinarily the making of four
subsidiary ones: (1) What the gross earnings from operating the utility under the rate in controversy would be. (A
prediction.); (2) What the operating expenses and charges,
while so operating, would be. (A prediction.); (3) The rate
base; that is, what the amount is on which a return should
be earned. (Under Smyth v. Ames, an opinion, largely.); (4)
What rate of return should be deemed fair. (An opinion,
largely.)228
The “historical cost” or “prudent investment” principle was used by
several later courts, including that in Federal Power Commission v. Hope
Natural Gas, Co.,229 as a replacement for the flawed “fair value” rule.230
The value of the “historical cost” or “prudent investment” principle lies in
the fact that “the utility is compensated for all prudent investments at their
actual cost when made–their “historical” cost–irrespective of whether individual investments are deemed necessary or beneficial in hindsight.”231 This
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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method involves less risk, since all investments are accounted for, and as a
result, allows for a lower rate of return, because the base rate is broader.232
In Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas, Co.,233 the Federal Power Commission (FPC) contended that the defendant, Hope Natural
Gas Co.’s rates were unreasonable and therefore unlawful, and issued a rate
order reducing the rates that Hope Natural Gas Co. would be allowed to
charge.234 Hope Natural Gas Co. argued that the FPC did not have the right
to regulate the rates they charged, and additionally that the rates they were
requiring were unjust and unreasonable.235 The Court reversed the judgment
of the lower court, finding that the FPC had the right to regulate the rates
that Hope Natural Gas Co. charged.236
In addition, the Court held that the rates they were requiring were just
and reasonable, stating that “[r]ates which enable [a] company to operate
successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to
compensate its investors for the risk assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return
on the so called ‘fair value’ rate base.”237 The court reasoned that “‘fair
value’ is the end product of the process of rate-making not the starting point
. . . . [and] that rates cannot be made to depend upon ‘fair value’ when the
value of the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may
be anticipated.”238 In so holding, the court abandoned the Smyth239 reasoning in favor of the “historical cost” or “prudent investment” principle laid
out by Justice Brandeis.240
C.

OTHER ALTERNATIVES

While each of these tests that can be, and sometimes today are, used in
determining reasonable rates, legislatures alternatively may institute a system of rate caps across an entire industry.241 Rate caps effectively limit the
percentage by which companies within an industry can raise rates, or impose a maximum rate increase.242 In other words, the legislature “caps” rate
increases for an industry, such as the insurance industry.243 The logic be232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
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hind imposing rate caps lies in the economy of business.244 As rates increase, the efficiency at which an industry does business also increases.245
The increased efficiency at which the industry is conducting business causes a decrease in the unit cost of supplying the services that the business
provides.246 Therefore, the cost of supplying the services balanced against
the increased rates will even out at some point, which the legislature may
calculate.247 It is at that point that the legislature will “cap” rate increases
for the industry since there would presumably be no need for any increases
beyond that point.248
Contemporary courts have taken a different approach in coming up
with a method of analyzing ratemaking cases under the Fifth Amendment.249 The court in Duquesne250 was the first to abandon the body of
thinking that it was the method behind which the rates were created that
determined whether the rate was reasonable or not.251 Instead, the Duquesne
court found that no single formula for fixing utility rates was mandated by
the Constitution.252 They abandon both the Smyth253 reasoning and that of
Justice Brandeis,254 in favor of a modified approach.255 According to the
court in Duquesne, the Constitution simply requires that the utility be allowed to receive a rate of return that is not so unjust as to be confiscatory,
regardless of the method used in determining that rate.256 Instead of evaluating the “base rate”257 by using either the “fair value” rule or the “historical
cost” principle, the court must evaluate several considerations surrounding
the facts and circumstances of each case, including the “value of the company and the return upon prudent investments.”258
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V.ANALYSIS
A.

DOES RATEMAKING APPLY TO PPACA?

There are several arguments that can be made against the application
of ratemaking case law to PPACA. First, the health insurance industry prePPACA could not and never was characterized as a public utility.259 Health
insurance companies have always been private companies operating within
a free market, and competing with each other to provide health plans for
consumers at the best possible price.260 Public utilities, on the other hand,
are private organizations that are given monopolies in an industry to provide a public service.261 Due to their advantaged position within a noncompetitive market, these companies are subject to heavy regulation.262
Under PPACA, and especially by implementation of the State Exchanges
established by PPACA, health insurance companies essentially become de
facto public utilities.263
Both the federal and state governments now have extremely integral
roles within the insurance industry, which is evident through the various
provisions detailed previously.264 For example, through the State Exchanges, insurers must submit any proposed rate increases to an applicable
state authority along with a justification for such increase.265 In turn, the
state will determine whether or not such rate increase is “reasonable,” and
will decide whether or not to allow the insurer to implement such a rate
increase.266 Additionally, if a state believes that any qualified health plan is
“unreasonably” increasing rates, that state may decertify that plan as a qualified health plan, rendering such plan unable to access federal subsidies.267
To use another provision, the rating system in place for qualified health
plans, and even the certification process for qualified health plans, allows
the federal government to pick and choose which companies should receive
the most business, and which companies should be rendered insolvent.268
Even outside of the State Exchanges, insurance companies are subject to
substantial regulation, such as the requirement that all plans must contain
the Essential Health Benefits Package detailed in section 2707 of
259. See Epstein, supra note 36, at 1.
260. Id.
261. 64 AM. JUR., 2D Public Utilities § 68 (2001).
262. Id.
263. See Epstein, supra note 19, at 2.
264. See supra Part II.B.
265.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311, 124
Stat. 119, 173 (2010).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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PPACA.269 The federal and state governments essentially have unbridled
control over the manner in which all insurance companies do business.270
This substantial amount of control over both business operations and revenues, along with the considerable subsidies provided to qualified health
plans within State Exchanges, effectively transforms the health insurance
industry into a governmental program, making the health insurance industry
analogous to public utilities.271
Second, the MLR provision in PPACA does not explicitly set rates for
insurance companies, but instead places a hard cap on the profits any company may receive.272 In theory, when one analyzes the MLR provision
alone, insurance companies may charge whatever rates they choose, as long
as their non-claims expenses do not exceed the maximum allowable percentage for those expenses, or their expenses for claims and other activities that
improve health care quality amount to a minimum of eighty to eighty-five
percent of the premiums they take in.273 However, when all the provisions
are taken in the aggregate, PPACA severely limits insurance companies’
ability to increase rates.274 The most obvious illustration of this is the requirement that qualified health plans submit and justify any proposed rate
increases to the state authority for approval.275 Not only do insurance companies face the very real possibility of having their rate increases deemed
“unreasonable,” resulting in either the state not allowing them to implement
the rate increase or the decertification of their qualified health plan, but also
the insurance companies must incur the time and expense involved in going
through the drawn out process of rate justifications and approvals, requiring
the company to continue to suffer losses, extending the time that plans are
inadequately priced, and not allowing the company to adequately respond
to the market.276 In addition, any rate increases that insurance companies
manage to implement to cover additional costs will simply have to be rebated back to the insureds at the end of the year.277
Finally, it is proper to apply ratemaking case law to PPACA because
the ultimate goal that the Supreme Court is trying to achieve is the same:
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, companies should be allowed

200.
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to receive a reasonable rate of return on their investments.278 The federal
government has never before tried to regulate an entire industry in a manner
as extensive as PPACA.279 Ratemaking case law is the most analogous
precedent that can be applied to the actions being taken through PPACA,
because it seems clear that ratemaking was what the legislature intended to
do through the MLR provision, and therefore, should suffice to achieve a
just outcome based in the Constitution.
B.

WHY RATEMAKING WAS WRONGLY IMPLEMENTED IN DRAFTING PPACA

Legislatures traditionally implement ratemaking laws to limit the rates
of return monopolies receive in noncompetitive markets.280 The overarching
goal in implementing ratemaking legislation is to bring a company’s rates
down to those that they could reasonably receive in a competitive market.281
The health insurance industry, on the other hand, has never been a monopolized market, but instead has always involved free competition among various insurance companies.282 In an industry where there is existing competition, the goals behind implementing ratemaking legislation become moot–
they have already been achieved, since each company is already operating
at competitive rates within that market.283 Because there existed competition within the market before the implementation of the MLR provision in
PPACA, Congress wrongly applied ratemaking legislation in trying to regulate the health care industry.
In addition, Congress asserted that their goal in implementing a minimum MLR in PPACA was to minimize costs involved in the health care
industry, and increase efficiency.284 There is no doubt that the health care
industry is laden with high-cost services and procedures all conducted
through complicated transactions.285 However, implementing ratemaking
legislation accomplishes neither of these goals.286 In fact, ratemaking legislation almost always increases costs within an industry because of the large
amounts of administrative costs involved in complying with these new
laws.287 Additionally, ratemaking legislation often reduces efficiency within
an industry because it takes away incentives for these companies to find
278. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1989).
279. See Epstein, supra note 36, passim.
280. See id; see also Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 313.
281. Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 314-15.
282. See Epstein, supra note 36, at 20-21.
283. Id. at 21.
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285. See Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
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ways to increase efficiency.288 PPACA takes away the incentive for insurers
to provide important and beneficial services, such as customer service, convenience, clarity, support, etc., since these expenses must be taken out of
the twenty percent left to the insurers for “profit”. It also takes away the
incentive to prevent fraud–which costs the health care industry billions of
dollars a year. Because ratemaking legislation achieves none of the goals
that Congress set out to accomplish, it is inappropriate for remedying the
problems within the health care industry.
C.

PROBABLE RESULTS OF INSTITUTING THE MLR

Taken in conjunction with the various other provisions contained in
PPACA, the minimum MLR places substantial burdens on the health insurance industry through regulation of an unconstitutional magnitude. In applying Fifth Amendment ratemaking case law, the MLR must allow insurance companies the ability to receive a reasonable rate of return on their
investments.289 Regardless of the test used, the MLR provision in PPACA
clearly fails.290 According to Duquesne, a court must simply assess the facts
and circumstances surrounding the business and the ratemaking law in order to determine whether the rate is excessive or confiscatory.291 The high
level of regulation placed on companies within the insurance industry, the
level of coercion involved, and the high probability that most insurance
companies will not be able to survive in a post-PPACA era without becoming a governmental program leads to the conclusion that the MLR provision
rises to the level of an unconstitutional taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment.
First, the MLR provision is essentially a hard cap on the profits that
insurance companies may retain, but incorporates no assurance that a company will receive a minimum rate of return.292 This in and of itself makes it
impossible for any insurance company to receive a reasonable rate of return.293 Even if the eighty to eighty-five percent MLR was determined to be
at the competitive level, “it is not constitutionally permissible to impose an
annual rate cap just at the competitive level, while leaving the carrier obligated to eat the losses in poor years.”294 By failing to incorporate a minimum rate of return, PPACA puts insurance companies in the very real dan288.
289.
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ger of having to operate at a loss, year after year.295 Moreover, insurance
companies run the risk of operating at a loss, while still not attaining the
MLR mandated by PPACA, in which case they would owe their insureds
the rebate, and fall further into insolvency. Except in the highly improbable
instance where a company receives exactly the competitive rate every year,
a system such as this necessarily deprives every company in the industry of
their constitutionally guaranteed reasonable rate of return over time.296
Notwithstanding any other provision within PPACA, this fact alone invalidates the MLR provision.297
When various other provisions of PPACA are taken into account,
however, it becomes even clearer that the MLR infringes on the constitutional rights of companies within the health insurance industry.298 In fact,
the federal government has conceded that “the Act will have serious negative consequences, e.g., encouraging people to forego health insurance until
medical services are needed, increasing premiums and costs for everyone,
and thereby bankrupting the health insurance industry.”299 For example,
insurers may not deny coverage to anyone who applies for it, unless they
can positively demonstrate that they do not have the financial capacity to
underwrite further coverage.300 However, there are numerous administrative
costs involved in this process, and the time required to go through the filing
process and respond to questions slows speed to market, thereby slowing
down the ability of a company to respond to changes in the marketplace.
This requires the company to continue to suffer losses, extend the time that
plans are inadequately priced, and not even allow the company to reduce
prices quickly and efficiently. Even after all of this, there is still no guarantee that state administrators will find in favor of the insurer.301 Additionally,
further burdens are placed on insurers who deny coverage for lack of financial capacity in that they cannot re-enter the market for 180 days subsequent.302
Insurers are further restricted in their ability to adjust rates.303 Not only
are insurers restricted from denying coverage to anyone, but they are also
restricted from rating for any reason other than the type of plan, geography,
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Epstein, supra note 36, at 22-23.
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age, and tobacco use.304 This means that insurers must provide coverage at
the same or a similar rate for every person, regardless of the risk involved
in covering such person.305 The Essential Health Benefits Package that insurers are required to provide for every applicant simply adds to the financial burden placed on insurance companies.306 Insurers must provide benefits that their insureds do not need (such as coverage for pregnancy for
men) and that the insurers cannot afford, without raising prices for these
benefits.307 “Any system that reduces revenues, raises costs, and increases
uncertainty cannot possibly meet the applicable constitutional standard.”308
In essence, PPACA requires insurance companies to cover more, higher-risk people, and more medical conditions, without allowing them to adjust rates accordingly.309 In addition, PPACA places countless new administrative costs on the insurer that are not accounted for in the MLR provision.310 When taken in the aggregate, it becomes clear that a majority of
companies in the health insurance industry will be driven into insolvency
due to their inability to meet the MLR.311 As a result, the MLR provision
likely constitutes an unlawful taking of property under the Fifth Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The minimum medical loss ratio provisions in PPACA should be held
as an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation under
the Fifth Amendment for several reasons. The health insurance industry is
not monopolized, and as such, regulates rates itself through competition in
the free market.312 Legislative ratemaking is used in the public utility context to prohibit monopolies from receiving rates of return significantly
higher than those that they could obtain in a competitive market, without
eliminating the market all together by imposing so small a rate of return as
to drive companies out of business.313 Therefore, ratemaking in the health
insurance industry makes little sense.314 There is no need for the legislature

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

See supra Part II.B.
See Epstein, supra note 19, at 17.
§ 2707, 124 Stat. at 161; see supra Part II.B.3.
Id.
Epstein, supra note 19, at 23.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Epstein, supra note 19, at 19-20.
Id.

2011]

DEAD ON ARRIVAL

611

to regulate rates in an industry that is not monopolized and is already effectively regulated by competition in the free market.315
The minimum loss ratio imposed necessarily deprives insurance companies of their constitutional right to earn a reasonable rate of return, because it fails to account for “bad years” by forcing health insurance companies to rebate the extra earned profit in “good years,” as well as rebate eighty to eighty-five percent even while operating at a loss in some cases.316
Therefore, over a period of several years, insurance companies necessarily
receive lower than a competitive rate, except in the highly improbable instance that they earn exactly the competitive rate of return every year.317
This strict, non-fluctuating eighty to eighty-five percent minimum loss ratio
takes no annual factors into account, such as the economic environment of
that year, sickness epidemics that would require higher claims payouts, and
other varying factors. By not allowing insurance companies to keep extra
profit in “good years” to offset deficits in “bad years,” PPACA is essentially forcing insurance companies into bankruptcy.
In addition, the MLR currently in place under PPACA is excessively
high, and certain to be ruinous for the health insurance industry. An eighty
to eighty-five percent minimum loss ratio deprives insurance companies of
their constitutional right to earn a fair, competitive rate of return.318 Under
all Fifth Amendment Takings Clause tests, the minimum loss ratio would
be considered confiscatory, because insurance companies financially will
not be able to handle the increased cost involved in the presumed influx of
business and increase in administrative costs caused by the various requirements imposed by PPACA, while maintaining such a significantly
higher loss ratio.319
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